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DOUBLE DIPPERS OR BUREAUCRACY
BUSTERS? FALSE CLAIMS ACT SUITS
BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
ELLETTA SANGREY CALLAHAN
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, convinced that fraud against the government had reached
epic proportions,' Congress turned to a classic strategy to combat the
problem: exchanging money for information. To effect this strategy,
legislators built on the existing framework of the False Claims Act (FCA
or Act).2 Originally enacted in 1863,3 the FCA imposes liability on
individuals and organizations who present fraudulent claims to the federal
* Associate Professor of Law and Public Policy, Syracuse University School of
Management. B.A., Wellesley College, 1979; J.D., Syracuse University College of Law,
1984.
1. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS REFORM ACT OF 1985, S.
REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267
[hereinafter SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY] ("Fraud permeates all Government
programs ranging from welfare and food stamps benefits, to multibillion dollar defense
procurements, to crop subsidies and disasters relief programs.").
2. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-3733 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995) (amended by 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729-3733 (1994)).
3. An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the United States,
ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (amended and codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994)).
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government.4 The Act also authorizes private parties to initiate a suit on
behalf of the United States, and it awards them a share of the proceeds
recovered from the defendant.5
By the middle of the twentieth century, however, judicial interpreta-
tions and legislative action had limited the incentives for private parties
to file a suit on behalf of the United States.6 Amendments passed by
Congress in 1986, however, including provisions significantly increasing
potential recoveries for private plaintiffs, led to a phenomenal increase
in the number of FCA suits.7 Current and former employees of the
federal government filed some of these suits based on information they
gained on their jobs.' These suits, which had been barred by statutory
language deleted in 1986, raise a host of practical and policy issues.9
4. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
5. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1), (c)(1), (d).
6. See infra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
8. See United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 39 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1994)
(reversing a dismissal of qui tam action brought by former auditor for the United States
Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General); United States er reL Williams v. NEC
Corp., 931 F.2d 1493 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (reversing dismissal of qui tam action brought by
former Air Force attorney); United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water
Agency, 929 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding jurisdiction of qui tam action filed by
assistant district counsel of Army Corps of Engineers); United States ex reL Fine v. MK-
Ferguson Co., 861 F. Supp. 1544 (D.N.M. 1994) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss
in action filed by former assistant manager of Department of Energy Inspector General's
Office); United States v. Stem, 818 F. Supp. 1521 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (determining costs in
a qui tam action brought by former federal employee); United States ex rel. Givier v.
Smith, 760 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (denying motion to dismiss in suit filed by former
housing commissioner); United States ex rel. McDowell v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 755
F. Supp. 1038 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (rejecting Government motion to dismiss in claim filed by
federal employee), af'd, 999 F.2d 1583 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. CAC-Ramsay,
Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (granting motion of former employee of the
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, to share in
settlement of FCA suit), ajffd, 963 F.2d 384 (11th Cir. 1992); United States ex rel
LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 729 F. Supp. 170 (D. Mass. 1990) (denying plaintiff's motion
to strike Government's reservation of rights in qui tam action brought by former Quality
Assurance Specialist of the United States Defense Contract Administrative Service
(DCAS)), aff'd, 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 921 (1991); Erickson
ex rel. United States v. American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Va.
1989) (dismissing suit brought by employee of Agency for International Development
(AID) because the employee failed to follow proper procedures). See infra note 25
(defining "qui tam').
9. See infra notes 68-107 and accompanying text.
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To their detractors, government employees who file FCA suits are
shameless exploiters of the public trust.10 Other observers believe that
federal workers should receive the same rewards as other whistleblowers
who risk retaliation to disclose fraud against the government."
Congress and the courts continue to grapple with this issue.
This Article begins with a brief description of the False Claims Act
and its 1986 amendments. The Article then describes the Act's
jurisdictional provisions, which classify potential plaintiffs. Next, the
Article discusses judicial and congressional responses to the 1986
amendments and how they relate to FCA suits filed by government
employees. Finally, the Article evaluates the benefits and drawbacks of
permitting government workers to file FCA suits and proposes a
framework for permitting such actions in certain circumstances.
II. AN OUTLINE OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
Congress first passed the FCA at the urging of President Lincoln to
address widespread military procurements fraud during the American
Civil War; 2 however, it significantly revised the FCA in 1943'" and,
most recently, in 1986.14 As a result of the 1986 amendments, the
number of qui tam plaintiffs increased.15  First, the amendments
guarantee the plaintiff will recover the minimum amount from a
successful claim.' 6  Second, the amendments make it easier for the
10. See generally infra notes 111-13, 116-18, 144-45, 148-50 & 152-55 and
accompanying text (discussing arguments against allowing FCA suits by government
employees).
11. See generally infra notes 119 & 139-43 and accompanying text (outlining
considerations favoring FCA lawsuits by government employees).
12. For a discussion of the circumstances leading to the initial passage of the Act, see
United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1496-97 (11th Cir. 1991);
Erickson ex rel. United States v. American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908,
915 (E.D. Va. 1989).
13. See infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
14. For an extended discussion of the 1986 amendments, see Elletta Sangrey Callahan
& Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for
Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REv. 273, 305-18 (1992).
15. Id. at 305. See infra text accompanying notes 38-46.
16. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 14, at 305-07. See infra text accompanying notes
31-36.
1996]
Washington University Open Scholarship
100 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
plaintiff to prove an action.'7 Finally, the amendments broaden the
classes of potential plaintiffs."
At present, the Act provides that a person who knowingly seeks
payment of a false or fraudulent claim 9 from the United States
government?0 is liable for a civil penalty of $5000 to $10,000 per
17. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 14, at 305, 308-10. See infra note 23 and
accompanying text.
18. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 14, at 305, 310-14. See infra part III.
19. Congress made insignificant changes to the FCA in 1994. See Pub. L. No. 103-
272, 108 Stat. 1362 (1994) (current version at 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a) (West Supp. 1995)).
Actions covered by the FCA include those taken by any person who:
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee
of the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the
United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the
Government;
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent
claim allowed or paid;
(4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be
used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government or willfully
to conceal the property, delivers, or causes to be delivered, less property than
the amount for which the person receives a certificate or receipt;
(5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property
used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the
Government, makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that the
information on the receipt is true;
(6) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public
property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the
Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge the property; or
(7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money
or property to the Government, ...
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
The United States Supreme Court had indicated its support for an inclusive interpreta-
tion of the types of claims covered by the FCA. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390
U.S. 228, 232-33 (1968) ("The Act was intended to reach all types of frauds ... that
might result in financial loss to the government.'). Lower court decisions prior to 1986,
however, tended to take a less generous approach. See, e.g., Hansen v. National Comm'n
on the Observance of Int'l Women's Year, 628 F.2d 533, 534 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The False
Claims Act is limited to actions involving false demands for either the payment of money
or the transfer of property... .") (citing Hageny v. United States, 570 F.2d 924, 931 (Ct.
Cl. 1978)).
20. The Act also covers false claims "made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient
if the United States Government provides any portion of the money or property which is
requested or demanded, or if the Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or
[Vol. 49:97
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claim,"' as well as double or treble damages.22 The Act defines
"knowing" actions expansively, to include those taken in deliberate
ignorance of or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the
claim for payment.3
Although the FCA requires the Attorney General to enforce the
Act," a private party may bring a "qui tam" action." The Act
authorizes the qui tam plaintiff (referred to as the "relator") 26 to file suit
other recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded."
31 U.S.C. § 3729(c).
21. The Act defines "claim" to include "any request or demand, whether under
contract or otherwise, for money or property .. " Id. § 3729(c). Accordingly, the court
may assess the statutory penalty on the defendant for each false claim submitted.
22. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). The court awards treble damages unless it determines that:
(A) the person committing the violation ... furnished officials of the United
States responsible for investigating false claims violations with all information
known to such person about the violation within 30 days after the date on which
the defendant first obtained the information;
(B) such person fully cooperated with any Government investigation of such
violation; and
(C) at the time such person furnished the United States with the information
about the violation, no criminal prosecution, civil action, or administrative action
had commenced under [the Act] with respect to such violation, and the person
did not have actual knowledge of the existence of an investigation into such
violation;...
Id. § 3729(a)(A)-(C). The court awards double damages when a treble damages award is
unwarranted. Id.
23. A person "knowing" or "knowingly" has information if he:
(I) has actual knowledge of the information;
(2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or
(3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information, and
no proof of specific intent to defraud is required.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(l)-(3). Prior to the amended definition of "knowing," some courts
required the plaintiff to prove specific intent to defraud. See, e.g., United States v. Mead,
426 F.2d 118, 123 (9th Cir. 1970).
24. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a).
25. Id. § 3730(b), (c). The term "qui tam" derives from the phrase "qui tam pro
domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," meaning "who brings the action for
the king as well as for himself." Steve France, The Private War on Pentagon Fraud,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1990, at 46, 47.
26. A relator is an interested party who is "permitted to institute a proceeding in the
name of the People or the Attorney General when the right to sue resides solely in that
official." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1289 (6th ed. 1990).
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on behalf of the government 7 and to share in the proceeds recovered
from the defendant.28 To initiate an action, the FCA requires the relator
to serve "[a] copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially
all material evidence and information the person possesses" on the
Government.29 The Government then has sixty days to decide whether
it will assume the primary responsibility for prosecuting the claim."
The amount the relator may recover from the defendant depends
primarily on whether the government decides to prosecute the claim. If
the Justice Department declines the case, the Act provides for the
successful qui tam plaintiff to receive between 25% and 30% of the
judgment or settlement.' If the government decides to prosecute the
case, the Act provides for the relator to receive between 15% and 25%
of the amount recovered. 2 The amount of recovery depends on
whether the person "substantially contributed to the prosecution of the
action. 33 Even if the court determines that the relator filed a complaint
based primarily on information brought to light in a public source,
however, the relator may still recover.3a In such instances, the relator
may recover up to 10% of the proceeds, depending on the value of the
information the relator provided and her role in advancing the case.35
Regardless of whether the government proceeds with the action, the court
will also award the relator reasonable attorneys' fees, expenses, and
costs.
36
The framework of the Act, as reflected by the 1986 revisions, has
achieved the goal of its congressional architects.37 The revised FCA
27. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
28. Id. § 3730(d).
29. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
30. Id. § 3730(b)(4). The Government may move the court to extend this period for
good cause. Id. § 3730(b)(3).
31. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
32. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
33. Id.
34. Such sources include "allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil or
administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting
Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media .... ." [d.
35. Id.
36. Id. § 3730(d)(1)-(2).
37. See False Claims Act Implementation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
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has encouraged hundreds of potential whistleblowers to come forward.
Prior to the 1986 revisions, plaintiffs brought about six FCA claims per
year.38 From 1986 through February of 1995, plaintiffs filed 921 cases
and defendants paid approximately $880 million in settlements and
judgments.39 Although the majority of the actions have been against
defense contractors,' plaintiffs have also brought FCA claims in such
varied contexts as Medicare, 4  food stamps,42  disaster relief,43
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 1-2 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Hearing] (statement of Senator
Grassley) ("The 1986 amendments ... enhanced, encouraged and expanded citizen
involvement in fighting fraud against the taxpayers .... " The amendments encouraged
"private attorneys general in the war on fraud").
38. France, supra note 25, at 48.
39. Telephone Interview with Office of Public Affairs, United States Department of
Justice (June 2, 1995). Of the 921 cases, 243 were still under seal and the government
had not decided whether to take over prosecution. In 144 cases where a decision had been
made, the Government joined the qui tam plaintiff, an intervention rate of approximately
21.2%. Ninety-seven of the cases the Government entered were settled or tried to
judgment. This resulted in a total recovery of approximately $864 million. Relators have
received about 18% of this amount. Id.
The government declined to join 504 cases. Three hundred seventy-five of these cases
are no longer active because the court dismissed them or because the relator decided not
to pursue them. In the 22 private relator cases which were resolved, either by settlement
or judgment, the government recovered approximately $16.6 million. Where it has been
determined, the average relator share in these recoveries was approximately 29%. Id.; see
also Josh Chetwynd, Recoveries by US. From Civil Fraud Surged in Fiscal '94, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 12, 1994, at B16 (discussing 1994 fraud recovery statistics).
A number of FCA defendants have settled the cases against them for significant
amounts of money. United Technologies Corporation agreed to a record-setting payment
of S150 million. The qui tam plaintiff, a former United Technologies vice president, will
receive $22.5 million. See Largest False Claims Act Settlement Pays Ex-Executive Who
Reviewed Billing, 12 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 402 (Apr. 11, 1994). In July, 1994,
Litton Systems, Inc. agreed to pay an $82 million settlement. See $82 Million Settlement
Paidfor Alleged Shifting of Costs, 12 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 850 (Aug. 1, 1994).
Teledyne Industries, Inc., tentatively settled two cases for $112.5 million. See Teledyne
to Pay $112 Million to Settle Qui Tam Cases Alleging False Tests, Costs, 12 Employee
Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 487 (May 2, 1994). Overall, FCA penalties for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 1994 totaled $378 million. This is more than twice the total for the
previous year. Harvey Berkman, A Few Big Penalties Makefor a Record Year, NAT'L.
L.J., Oct. 24, 1994, at A16.
40. See, e.g., Boeing Pays $75 Million to Settle U.S. Overcharging Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 1994, at 41; Dan Kane, Ex- Worker Sues GE over Radar, SYRACUSE HERALD
AM., Apr. 10, 1994, at Al; Calvin Sims, Teledyne to Pay Big Fine to US., N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 1994, at D1, D6; United Technologies to Pay Fine in Whistleblower Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1994, at D3.
41. See United States v. CAC-Ramsay, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(charging a violation of FCA by accepting Medicare overpayments).
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scientific misconduct,' telecommunications, 41 and municipal
improvement.46  The 1986 amendments relating to jurisdiction,
however, have provided fertile ground for defendants and, in some
instances, Justice Department attorneys seeking to impede qui tam suits,
I. JURISDICTION UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
A. Generally
When Congress originally enacted the FCA in 1863, it provided for
a universal class of potential relators.47 Indeed, the legislative history
reveals that Congress anticipated qui tam suits by government
prosecutors.48 In 1943, however, the Supreme Court's decision in
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess49 prompted Congress to make
significant revisions to the Act's jurisdiction section.
In Marcus, the relator brought a qui tam action against electrical
contractors who were employed to work on Public Works Administration
projects." The defendants and the Federal Government claimed that
42. See Blusal Meats, Inc. v. United States, 638 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(alleging FCA violation through knowing acceptance and presentation of stolen food
stamps), aff'd, 817 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1987).
43. See United States v. Killough, 625 F. Supp. 1399 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (alleging a
kick-back scheme where non-official defendants inflated their bids on emergency housing
contracts in order for the official defendants to receive a kick-back).
44. See Steven Burd, Government Uses Anti-Fraud Law to Push 2 Universities to
Settle Misconduct Suit, CHRON. HIGHER EDUc., Aug. 3, 1994, at A29 (reporting $1.6
million settlement in a case where the government alleged a researcher, in completing a
grant application, made false statements regarding previous research results).
45. See United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493 (1 1th Cir. 1991)
(alleging bid-rigging by a corporation pursuing federal telecommunications contracts).
46. See United States v. Board of Educ., 697 F. Supp. 167 (D.N.J. 1988) (alleging
illegal scheme resulting in a misappropriation of federal funds designated for school
improvement).
47. The law provided that "suit may be brought and carried on by any person, as well
for himself as for the United States." An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the
Government of the United States, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, 698 (1863) (current version at 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994)).
48. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955 (1863) (statement of Senator Howard)
("Even the district attorney, who is required to be vigilant in the prosecution of such cases,
may be also the informer.").
49. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
50. Id. at 539.
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Marcus should not be permitted to file a qui tam action because he
allegedly based his complaint on a publicly available criminal fraud
indictment." The Government strenuously objected to the Court's FCA
jurisdiction over the case and argued that the relator had "contributed
nothing to the discovery of th[e] crime."52 Nonetheless, the Court held
that Marcus could recover, and indicated that the legislature should
address the Government's argument.
5 3
Congress quickly responded to the Supreme Court's holding in
Marcus. It revised the law less than a year later to exclude
"parasitical"' FCA suits.55 As amended in 1943, the Act prohibited
FCA claims "whenever it... appear[ed] that such suit was based upon
evidence or information in the possession of the United States, or any
agency, officer or employee thereof, at the time such suit was
brought."'5
6
Over time, it became apparent that the 1943 amendments were
perhaps too effective. Although they barred parasitical suits, the
amendments also excluded claims brought by parties who had provided
the government with information about a false claim but had not yet filed
a suit." Because such actions were "based upon evidence or
information in the possession of the United States, 58 the courts rejected
51. Id. at 545.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 546-47 & n.9.
54. See, e.g., United States exreL Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1104 (7th Cir.
1984) (describing the qui tam suit in Marcus as "parasitical" because the plaintiff
supported the claim with publicly available information).
55. Act of Dec. 23, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-213, 57 Stat. 608 (current version at 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994)).
56. An Act to Limit Private Suits for Penalties and Damages Arising out of Frauds
Against the United States, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608, 609 (1943) (amending 31 U.S.C.
§ 3491(C)).
57. The Act also precluded suits by potential relators who brought to light information
coincidentally possessed by the government. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE
CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1992, H.R. REP. No. 837, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992)
[hereinafter HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY].
58. 57 Stat. 608, 609.
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them. 9 As a result, discouraged individuals did not disclose evidence
of misconduct to the government so that they could file qui tam suits.60
In the 1980s, the views of congressional representatives became
aligned with those of frustrated potential qui tam plaintiffs. In order to
encourage citizen assistance with what many considered an appalling
level of fraud against the government, 61 Congress amended the jurisdic-
tional provisions of the FCA. The 1986 amendments guaranteed
minimum recoveries for qui tam plaintiffs, 62 and implemented other
revisions. 63
Structurally, the current Act does not identify characteristics or
classes of appropriate relators. Rather, it addresses this issue by
establishing four categories of cases over which a court is forbidden to
exercise jurisdiction.6 The Act bars certain actions brought by current
or former military personnel against members of the armed forces,
actions brought against federal legislators, judges, and senior officials,
and actions factually related to legal or administrative proceedings in
59. See United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1103-04 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding state's qui tam action barred by language of 1943 FCA Amendments, even
though state was original source of information possessed by the federal government
regarding Medicaid fraud, and state had prosecuted responsible physician); United States
ex rel. Weinberger v. Florida, 615 F.2d 1370, 1371 (5th Cir. 1980) (dismissing suit where
plaintiff disclosed substantially all the evidence to the United States Attorney General prior
to bringing suit); Pettis ex rel. United States v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 577 F.2d 668, 669-
70 (9th Cir. 1978) (dismissing action where plaintiff previously supplied the government
with information).
60. Patrick W. Hanifin, Qui Tam Suits by Federal Government Employees Based on
Government Information, 20 PUB. CONT. L.J. 556, 569 (1991) (denying the government
valuable information concerning misconduct weakened law enforcement).
61. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 1, at 2, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N., at 5266-67.
62. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (outlining FCA award provisions).
63. For a summary of the 1986 revisions to the Act, see Callahan & Dworkin, supra
note 14, at 305-18.
Congress further amended the FCA in 1988 to permit courts to reduce rewards below
the percentage established by the Act in cases where the relator helped plan the fraud upon
which the claim was based, "taking into account the role of that person in advancing the
case to litigation and any relevant circumstances pertaining to the violation." Major Fraud
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-700, § 9(a)(2), 102 Stat. 4638 (amending 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(d)).
64. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1)-(4).
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which the government is a party.6 The fourth category of prohibited
actions includes those based on publicly disclosed information:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action... based
upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions
in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting
Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the
news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney
General or the person bringing the action is an original
source of the information.
The FCA defines an "original source" as "an individual who has direct
and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations
are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the
Government before filing an action under this section which is based on
the information." 67
B. Government Employees
Although the FCA originally authorized suits by government
employees," courts applying the FCA after the 1943 amendments
consistently barred government employees from bringing suit.69
Although the congressional reformers in 1943 focused on the source of
65. The three pertinent subsections of the jurisdictional section provide:
(1) No court shall have jurisdiction over [a qui tam] action brought by a former
or present member of the armed forces ... against a member of the armed forces
arising out of such person's service in the armed forces.
(2)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought ... against a
Member of Congress, a member of the judiciary, or a senior executive branch official
if the action is based on evidence or information known to the Government when the
action was brought ....
(3) In no event may a person bring an action.., which is based upon allegations
or transactions which are the subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money
penalty proceeding in which the Government is already a party.
Id. § 3730(e)(l)-(3).
66. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
67. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
68. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., United States ex rel. McCans v. Armour & Co., 146 F. Supp. 546, 550
(D.D.C. 1956) ("[The 0 statute was intended to prevent a former government employee
from bringing an action... where the information upon which the suit is founded was
obtained by reason of his government employment."), aff'd, 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 834 (1958).
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the information rather than the employment circumstances of the
information-bearer, the language of the revisions cut a broader swath.7"
After Congress amended the FCA in 1986, it neither expressly
permitted nor precluded government employees from filing suit,7 and
the legislative history concerning this issue is unclear.72 Nevertheless,
parties have made arguments that the FCA bars government employees
from initiating FCA actions based on the public disclosure exception to
jurisdiction73 as well as policy considerations.
In the absence of definitive legislative history, courts have utilized
several statutory interpretation devices to respond to jurisdictional
challenges regarding government employee relators. The most straight-
forward analysis characterizes Congress' failure, in 1986, to preserve the
1943 limitation on "information already in the possession of the United
States" as a repeal of the quoted language.74 Further, courts presume
that the legislators involved in the 1986 revisions had knowledge that
Congress amended the provision in 1943 because of the Supreme Court's
expansive interpretation of the FCA in Marcus.75 Courts perceived this
as relevant because the language adopted in 1986 is similar to that of the
original Act, which permitted government employees to file suits. 76
70. See supra text accompanying note 56 for the language of the 1943 amendment.
The qui tam plaintiff in the case that provided the catalyst for the 1943 congressional
reform was presumably not a government employee. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,
317 U.S. 537 (1943).
71. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
72. See Erickson ex rel. United States v. American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716
F. Supp. 908, 912 (E.D. Va. 1989) (noting that the question of whether government
employees may maintain qui tam actions "must be sought indirectly through the statute's
... history").
73. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). For the language of § 3730(e)(4), see supra text
accompanying note 66.
74. United States exrel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1501-02 (lth Cir.
1991) (rejecting the Government's argument that the 1986 amendments did not repeal the
1943 amendments). See supra text accompanying note 56 for the 1943 amendment, and
supra text accompanying note 66 for the 1986 amendment.
75. United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416,
1420 (9th Cir. 1991). See Williams, 931 F.2d at 1501-03 (discussing and refiuting Justice
Department's argument that the bar to government employee actions imposed by the 1943
amendments was not repealed in 1986); Erickson, 716 F. Supp. at 914 n.10 (comparing
the language of the 1943 and 1986 revisions).
76. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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Courts have also examined how the legislature drafted the jurisdic-
tional provisions: "Congress... could have chosen to make eligible as
qui tam relators only certain defined groups of persons and exclude all
others or it could have chosen to include all persons as eligible qui tam
relators with specific exceptions."" Because Congress adopted the
second format, the courts have inferred that it intended an expansive
approach toward potential qui tam plaintiffs including, presumably,
government employees.78 Several courts have also observed that the
jurisdictional bar to disclosures by military personnel would be superflu-
ous if legislators had intended to prohibit all government employee
suits. 9 On the basis of considerations such as these, in combination
with the absence of explicit statutory language, the only reported decision
concluding that all government employee qui tam suits are barred by the
post-1986 FCA was overruled on this point on appeal.80
77. Erickson, 716 F. Supp. at 912.
78. Williams, 931 F.2d at 1502 ("We cannot infer an additional exception absent a
clear indication by Congress ... it also meant to bar all government employees.");
Erickson, 716 F. Supp. at 913 ("[C]ongress' choice of structure is compelling: Government
employees are ... permissible qui tam plaintiffs.").
79. Williams, 931 F.2d at 1502 (excluding army personnel would be unnecessary if
Congress intended to exclude all government employees); Erickson, 716 F. Supp. at 913-
14 (noting that the armed forces exclusion is not a blanket exclusion of all government
employees).
80. United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 729 F. Supp. 170 (D. Mass. 1990),
aft'd, 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990). Although it disagreed with the district court's
conclusion that no government employee may sue as a qui tam plaintiff under the Act, the
First Circuit agreed with the district court's decision to bar suit on the facts of the case,
which a government quality assurance specialist had filed. 913 F.2d at 18, 19-20. The
court wrote: "It was LeBlanc's responsibility, a condition of his employment, to uncover
fraud. The fruits of his effort belong to his employer-the government." Id. at 20. Thus,
LeBlanc did not have "independent knowledge of the information," which the statute
requires. Id.
Authorities have questioned the circuit court's analysis because the evaluation whether
LeBlanc was an original source was unnecessary, given the court's prior conclusion that
the information in question had not been publicly disclosed. See Williams, 931 F.2d at
1500-01 n.13 (stating that the Raytheon court went one step too far); Kenneth D. Brody,
Recent Developments in the Area of "Qui Tam" Lawsuits, 37 FED. B. NEWS & J. 592, 596
(1990) ("the court's analysis of the original source issue was unnecessary").
Government employees have also been permitted to bring suit under the post-1986 Act
in the following reported cases: United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 39
F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing the district court's holding that all inspector general
auditors are prohibited from bringing qui tam actions); Williams, 931 F.2d 1493, 1494
(stating no specific limitations on government employee suits); United States ex rel.
Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating
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Judicial efforts to ascertain legislative intent regarding this issue
were apparently undertaken with greater care and deliberation than
Congress itself exercised in 1986. Key participants in the process of
drafting the amendments have stated that they did not consider the issue
of government employee suits at that time.81 Implementation of the
amendments, however, has led Congress to focus directly on this issue.
In 1990, the Subcommittee on Administrative and Governmental
Relations of the House Judiciary Committee held the first oversight
hearings on the FCA, as amended in 1986.82 Several witnesses
addressed the propriety of granting access to the FCA to current and
former federal workers. They focused primarily on the concern that such
individuals might withhold information from government investigators
and use it to support their qui tam claims.8 3 The Justice Department,
84
the 1943 language barring government employee suits disappeared from the statute in
1986); United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson Co., 861 F. Supp. 1544, 1549 (D.N.M.
1994) (ruling that employees of Inspector Generals' offices are not barred from bringing
FCA suits); United States v. Stem, 818 F. Supp. 1521, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that
a government employee is not precluded from obtaining a reward by constructive trust);
United States ex rel. Givler v. Smith, 760 F. Supp. 72, 74 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (implying
that government employee suits are permissible when it is not the relator's job to
investigate the matters upon which the action is based); United States ex rel. McDowell
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (requiring the
court to determine whether the plaintiff received her information from independent efforts
or from her job description prior to dismissing qui tam action), aff d, 999 F.2d 1583 (11th
Cir. 1993); United States v. CAC-Ramsay, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158, 1161 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(permitting suit by former Medicare fraud investigator on basis of information gained
during his employment), aft'd, 963 F.2d 384 (11th Cir. 1992); Erickson ex rel. United
States v. American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 912-18 (E.D. Va. 1989)
(finding no specific limitations on government employee suits).
81. See HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 57, at 5 (the issue was "simply
not contemplated"). See also Howard Mintz, Qui Tam on Campus: DOJ Policy Stiffs
Stanford Whistleblower, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at 2, 3 (quoting Representative
Howard Berman, one of the sponsors of the legislation resulting in the 1986 amendments
to the Act, as stating, "I'm embarrassed to say we did not spend any time ...
contemplating this question.").
82. See 1990 Hearing, supra note 37. The subcommittee received a positive progress
report. As the subcommittee chairman noted at the end of the hearing, "the basic news
is good." Id. at 101. See also 1990 Hearing, supra note 37, at 10 (statement of Assistant
Attorney General Gerson that "the new provisions have been a useful stimulus for citizens
to come forward with allegations of fraud against the Government"); id. at 30 (statement
of Inspector General Kusserow that his "experience thus far with qui tam indicates that it
is a successful program.').
83. 1990 Hearing, supra note 37, at 7 (statement of Senator Grassley); id. at 28
(statement of Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department
[Vol. 49:97
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol49/iss1/7
FALSE CLAIMS ACT SUITS
the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Servic-
es, 85 and John R. Phillips, an attorney who participated in drafting the
amendments and currently specializes in qui tam litigation, proposed
limits on FCA actions by federal employees.86
In early 1992, implementation concerns led Representative Howard
Berman, the principal House sponsor of the 1986 FCA amendments, to
introduce H.R. 4563 to revise the Act." Among other things, H.R.
4563 would have established limitations on government employees who
file qui tam suits based on information gained during the course of their
employment.88 The bill would have placed a ten percent cap on the
recoveries available to such relators.89 The actual reward amount would
have been subject to the court's discretion, depending on the relator's
contribution to the litigation as well as the diligence and success of his
of Justice); id. at 32 (statement of Richard P. Kusserow, Inspector General, Department
of Health and Human Services); id. at 75-76 (testimony of John R. Phillips, Esq.).
Witnesses also raised a number of other issues. For example, witnesses expressed
concerns regarding judicial interpretations of the Act's prohibition on claims based on
"publicly disclosed information." 1990 Hearing, supra note 37, at 5-6 (statement of
Senator Grassley); id. at 47-48 (statement of Inspector General Kusserow). Assistant
Attorney General Gerson spoke of potential and actual interference with ongoing
investigations caused by the filing of related qui tam actions. Id. at 12-14. Inspector
General Kusserow requested clarification of the scope of inspector generals' investigative
authority under the Act. Id. at 50-53.
84. 1990 Hearing, supra note 37, at 16, 28 (stressing that government investigators
or attorneys report misconduct through official channels).
85. Id. at 30, 32 (noting that a government employee should proceed with a qui tam
action only if the employee tried to funnel the information through the appropriate
channels and was thwarted).
86. Id. at 72, 75-76 (permitting a government employee to pursue a qui tam action
only after the court concludes the employee reasonably and in good faith notified the
appropriate officials).
87. False Claims Act Technical Amendments of 1992: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Hearing] (containing the proposed
legislation, H.R. 4563).
88. See id. at 2-4 for H.R. 4563 § 2. The Justice Department, however, had previously
introduced legislation which would have prohibited qui tam actions by government
employees altogether. 1d. at 17; HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 57, at 5,
8.
89. 1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 2.
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efforts to report the misconduct through government channels prior to
filing suit.90
The House of Representatives subcommittee charged with FCA
oversight held a hearing on H.R. 4563 the month after Representative
Berman introduced it.91 Following the hearing, the legislators amended
H.R. 4563 to require a government employee who seeks to file an FCA
action to give written disclosure of "substantially all material evidence
and information that relates to the alleged violation"'92 to a designated
official, and submit a written notification of the disclosure to the
employee's supervisor.' A federal relator would have been permitted
to file suit one year after the notification requirements were met, if the
Attorney General had not filed an action during that period.94 The
government would have been permitted to file a motion for a single
twelve-month extension of the waiting period, however, in cases where
it needed additional time to determine whether to file an action itself.95
In addition, the final version of H.R. 4563 would have empowered the
government to move to dismiss from the case a federal employee who
had not complied with these prerequisites. 96  The subcommittee,
90. The proposed legislation provided as follows:
[T]he court may award such sums as it considers appropriate ... taking into
account the extent to which prior to filing the action, the [government employee]
reasonably and in good faith attempted to bring the violation to the attention of the
Government authorities responsible for pursuing such violation, [and] whether the
authorities failed to diligently investigate and prosecute the violation....
Id.
91. 1992 Hearing, supra note 87. The subcommittee heard testimony from
representatives of the Departments of Justice and Defense, three government employee
relators, and attorney John R. Phillips. Id. at (III).
92. HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 57, at 2.
93. Id. In cases where the agency employing the potential claimant had an Inspector
General (IG), the bill specified the IG as the official. Where the employing agency did
not have an IG, the bill designated the Attorney General as a substitute. The bill defined
"supervisor" as "the officer or employee of the next highest rank to that of the
[whistleblower], who has supervisory authority over [the whistleblower], and who [the
whistleblower] believes is not culpable of the violation upon which the action under this
subsection is brought." Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1.
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however, abandoned the proposed ten percent cap on government
relators' recoveries. 97
Although the Judiciary Committee report accompanying H.R. 4563
does not explain the basis for the amended provisions, the hearing record
reveals that the subcommittee chair, Representative Barney Frank,
favored a framework including such prerequisites for suits by government
employees.98 Witnesses at the hearing also charged that a maximum
limit on recoveries by government employees would be a significant
disincentive to file a suit because of the enormous resources required to
pursue most FCA actions.99 The witnesses perceived this disincentive
to be exacerbated by the discretionary nature of the award.'0°
Additionally, the witnesses criticized the original version for its potential
to engender internal litigation between the Justice Department and the
relator regarding the amount of the award to be paid to the qui tam
plaintiff.'' The key House sponsor of FCA reform "adamantly
opposed" the complete ban on federal employee suits included in the
government's proposal because he viewed the vigilance of federal
workers as "a valuable check on government inaction."' 2 Four months
after Representative Berman introduced H.R. 4563, the Judiciary
97. For a textual explanation of the portion of H.R. 4563 covering government
employees, see Id. at 10.
98. See 1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 47-48 (quoting Rep. Frank that he "would like
to see some sort of exhaustion remedy').
99. See id. at 70, 105 (statements of James M. Hagood, a current FCA plaintiff and
former employee, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers).
100. See id. at 129 (statement of Arthur P. Williams, an FCA claimant and former
employee, United States Air Force); see also Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 14, at 305-
07 (discussing the likelihood that the 1986 amendments guaranteeing minimum recoveries
and reducing role of judicial discretion in award assessments would spur FCA qui tam
suits, in light of social-psychological research on financial rewards for performance).
101. See 1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 18 (statement of Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice); id. at 106 (statement of James
M. Hagood); see also Congress Grapples With Whistleblower Law, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 27,
1992, at 7 (noting that the discretionary award mechanism was characterized by opponents
and acknowledged by supporters as "a prescription for sticky internal litigation").
102. Congress Grapples With Whistleblower Law, supra note 101, at 7 (discussing
views of Rep. Howard L. Berman); see also False Claims Amendments Act of 1993:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Hearing] (statement
of Rep. Berman).
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Committee reported it, as amended, to the House of Representatives.1 °3
Although the House subsequently passed it,' the 102d Congress came
to an end without Senate action to amend the FCA.
Senators introduced legislation with language substantially identical
to the amended version of H.R. 4563 in the 103d Congress,'05 and the
Senate held hearings on its version in September, 1993.106 However,
neither branch of the Congress took any further action.'0 7
IV. DOUBLE DIPPERS OR BUREAUCRACY BUSTERS?
Litigants have advanced numerous arguments regarding the propriety
and practical implications of allowing qui tam suits by government
employees. Although the courts have quickly and nearly universally
rejected a few of the objections pressed by the Department of Justice in
litigated cases,' 8 more compelling problems have been identified by
both the Justice Department and other observers.
Since President Clinton took office in 1993, the Department of
Justice (DOJ or Justice) has not taken a formal position on the question
of whether all government employees should be barred from filing FCA
suits. 9 Nonetheless, Justice has argued that an employee of the
103. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 57, at 3.
104. 138 CONG. REc. H7978, H7980 (1992).
105. See S. 841, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993); H.R. 2915, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993).
106. See 1993 Hearing, supra note 102.
107. Telephone Interview with Bari Schwartz, Legislative Assistant to Rep. Howard
Berman (Aug. 3, 1994) (expecting no action during the remainder of the 103d Congress).
Efforts by a coalition of defense industry representatives to weaken the FCA may explain
the 103d Congress' failure to amend it. Senator Charles Grassley, the principal Senate
sponsor of the legislation, complained that the lobbyists were "trying to use my bill to
destroy qui tam." Sheila Kaplan, Whistleblower Law Under Attack, LEGAL TIMES, Feb.
14, 1994, at 5; see also John Mintz, Contractors Target Whistle-Blowers, WASH. POST,
May 5, 1994, at Bl l (reporting that "defense firms are using Grassley's bill to propose
their own changes to" the FCA).
108. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
109. Telephone Interview with Office of Public Affairs, supra note 39. During her
confirmation hearing, Deputy Attorney General Jaime S. Gorelick testified that the Clinton
administration would oppose attempts to weaken the FCA's qui tam provisions. See
Charley Roberts, Qui Tam Survival is Seen: Gorelick Says Limits on Actions to Be
Resisted, Los ANGELES DAILY J., Mar. 17, 1994, at 5; see also Marcia Chambers, Sua
Sponte, NAT'L L.J., June 21, 1993, at 15, 16 (characterizing the DOJ during the Reagan
and Bush administrations as resis.ant to qui tam claims, and predicting a shift in this
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Inspector General's office in the Department of Energy should be
precluded from filing qui tam actions because it was his job to uncover
the information on which he based his claims."0
Under previous administrations, Justice aggressively argued that all
current and former government employees should be barred from filing
qui tam actions."' The DOJ's zeal on this point was matched by the
creativity, and in some instances, the absurdity of its arguments. For
example, in several cases Justice asserted that the relator triggered the
FCA's "public disclosure" potential bar to a suit"2 "when [the relator]
as a government employee 'disclosed' to himself as a member of the
public the information on which he based his suit."".3 The courts have
consistently rejected this contention." 4  Judges have also found
position by Attorney General Janet Reno).
110. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 39 F.3d 957 (9th
Cir. 1994), rev'g 821 F. Supp. 1356 (N.D. Cal. 1993); United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-
Ferguson Co., 861 F. Supp. 1544 (D.N.M. 1994).
111. See, e.g., 1993 Hearing, supra note 102, at 5 (statement of Rep. Howard L.
Berman) (characterizing the DOJ's attitude under earlier administrations as "very
antagonistic"); Gail D. Cox, Qui Tam Suit is Heavy on Technicalities, NAT'L L.J., Mar.
15, 1993, at 8 (reporting that the DOJ "released on Jan. 15-Attorney General William
Barr's last day in office-a 38-page memo written in 1989 by Mr. Barr to then-Attorney
General Dick Thornburgh that argues the qui tam provisions are an unconstitutional
violation of the separation of powers doctrine" and characterizing this action as
"[v]alidating those who complain that the Bush administration was hostile to the suits').
112. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67 for a discussion of the "public
disclosure" jurisdictional provision.
113. United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416,
1419 (9th Cir. 1991); see also DEF. CONT. LrrIG. REP., July 16, 1990, at A-1807, 1811
(reprinting Brief for the United States at 16-17, United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon
Co., 913 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1246) (discussing the public disclosure
argument)).
114. United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1500 (1lth Cir.
1991) ("[W]e find no 'public disclosure"); Hagood, 929 F.2d at 1419 (holding no public
disclosure); LeBlanc, 913 F.2d at 20 (allowing government employees to file qui tam
actions based on information obtained during employment); United States v. CAC-Ramsay,
Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158, 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (concluding the qui tam suit was not barred
by public disclosure). Several qui tam cases brought by government employees, however,
have involved application of the Act's public disclosure requirement. See, e.g., Fine v.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 39 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'g 821 F. Supp. 1356 (N.D.
Cal. 1993).
In other FCA cases, the public disclosure provision has been well litigated since 1986.
See United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 651 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (applying the original source provision of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B)); United States
ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 5 F.3d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying the original
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unpersuasive the argument that the preparation of a contract by a
government attorney constituted engaging in an "administrative
investigation," thus meeting the public disclosure criteria."15
Justice also protested that the FCA outlet was simply unnecessary
for government employees because there were several well established
channels available to report misconduct." 6  During congressional
source provision), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1543 (1994); see also Kevin W. Daley, A Qui
Tam Action Under the False Claims Act, 22 CoLO. LAW. 229, 236 (1993) (discussing the
original source and public disclosure exceptions).
115. Hagood, 929 F.2d at 1419 (characterizing the Justice Department's assertions in
this regard as "tortured').
116. Federal whistleblowers have enjoyed statutory protection from retaliation since
the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), which defined as a
prohibited personnel practice the taking or failing to take a personnel action in reprisal for
an employee's disclosure of a violation of any law or an employee's disclosure of "gross
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific
danger to public health and safety." 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The CSRA created the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-09
(1988 & Supp. V 1993), and the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), 5 U.S.C. § 1211 (Supp.
V 1993), which were charged with investigating and resolving violations of the CSRA's
anti-retaliation provisions. The law had little practical effect, however, in overcoming
federal employees' fear of reprisal for disclosing governmental misconduct. See H.R. REP.
No. 274, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1987) (noting results of two of the surveys discussed
infra in text at notes 121-30). Government workers viewed the OSC as indifferent, if not
hostile, to employees' claims. See id. at 19-21; S. REP. No. 413, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
7-11 (1988). Restrictive court and MSPB decisions were determined to have impeded
whistleblower relief, as well. See id. at 11-16; H.R. REP. No. 274, at 25-29.
Congress designed the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA) to address these
concerns. Congress explicitly stated the Act's objectives within the law:
[T]o strengthen and improve protection for the rights of Federal employees, to
prevent reprisals, and to help eliminate wrongdoing within the Government by-
(1) mandating that employees should not suffer adverse consequences as
a result of prohibited personnel practices; and
(2) establishing-
(A) that the primary role of the Office of Special Counsel is to protect
employees, especially whistleblowers, from prohibited personnel practices;
(B) that the Office of Special Counsel shall act in the interests of
employees who seek assistance from the Office of Special Counsel; and
(C) that while disciplining those who commit prohibited personnel
practices may be used as a means by which to help accomplish that goal,
the protection of individuals who are the subject of prohibited personnel
practices remains the paramount consideration.
Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989). Although the WPA's provisions addressed a
number of criticisms that had been leveled by the CSRA, commentators characterize the
protection it offers as "illusory," in that it "carries forward the managerial bias of previous
law and results, with some exceptions, in only marginal improvement in whistleblower
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hearings in 1992, Assistant Attorney General Stuart M. Gerson stated that
"[i]n every one of the government employee cases where there has been
a recovery, the government was taking action on the allegations at the
time the qui tam suit was filed."'"17 Qui tam relators in several of these
cases, however, bitterly contested his characterizations." 18
In fact, the Act's substantial financial incentives may be necessary
to overcome potential government whistleblowers' fears of retaliation for
reporting misconduct that might otherwise remain undisclosed." 9
Although federal employees enjoy statutory protection against retaliation
for whistleblowing, ' such concerns are persistent and widespread.
The federal Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) has documented
these apprehensions in ongoing research. Approximately 8,600 federal
workers responded to the first study, distributed in 1980.121 About
45% of the respondents indicated that they had observed at least one
instance of illegal or wasteful activity in the prior year.' 22  Of this
protections." Brce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False Hope
for Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355, 358 (1991). Recent survey data confirm
these misgivings. See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
117. 1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 17.
118. Id. at 75 (statement of James M. Hagood) (describing the Justice Department as
an "advocate for defendants" in FCA suits); id. at 114-16, 119-20, 145-47 (statements of
Leon Weinstein) (describing supervisor's and DOJ's failure to respond to evidence of
alleged fraud).
119. See generally 1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 65 (testimony of John R. Phillips)
(detailing the risks faced by whistleblowers, including threats, harassment, isolation within
their employing organizations, lack of employability elsewhere, and deterioration of
personal relationships).
120. See supra note 116. The U.S. Department of Energy recently recognized the
inadequacy of existing whistleblower protection mechanisms when it announced a plan to
shield its government and contract employees from retaliation for expressing criticism.
Citing the need to bring agency critics "back into the fold," Energy Secretary Hazel R.
O'Leary stated: "We have zero tolerance for reprisals. It's as simple as that."
Whistleblowers and their advocates praised the plan. A proposal to "explore the possible
reopening of past disagreements with an eye to righting old wrongs" is viewed as
particularly noteworthy. See William J. Broad, Energy Dept. Giving Critics More Voice,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1994, at 29 (discussing the agency's plans to protect whistleblowers).
121. OFFICE OF MERIT SYSTEMS REVIEW AND STUDIES, UNITED STATES MERIT
SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE:
BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON FRAUD, WASTE, AND MISMANAGEMENT-WHO DOES IT AND
WHAT HAPPENS i-ii (1981).
122. Id. at 1.
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group, 70% did not blow the whistle on the misconduct they had
witnessed."u Nineteen percent of those who chose not to report the
misconduct based that decision on the fear of reprisal. 24 Approximate-
ly 20% of those who had disclosed wrongful activity indicated that they
had experienced or been threatened with retaliation.'25
The MSPB undertook a follow-up survey of nearly 5,000 govern-
ment employees in 1983126 Although the percentage of respondents
who had recently witnessed wrongful activity declined to 25%, the
proportion of those who failed to report their observations remained
nearly constant, at 69%.127 This result was both remarkable and
discouraging, in light of the government's actions taken before and after
the 1980 study to encourage whistleblowing among federal workers." 8
The study revealed further cause for concern with the nearly two-fold
increase, to 37%, in the percentage of respondents who claimed that fear
of reprisal had led to their decisions not to disclose information about
misconduct they had witnessed. 29 In addition, 23% of the respondents
who disclosed wasteful or illegal activity experienced actual or threatened
retaliation. 30
123. Id. at 2.
124. Id. Fifty-three percent of the respondents did not report the misconduct because
they believed no action would be taken. Id.
125. Id. at 3. The report noted that:
The most frequently cited forms of reprisal were more subjective, discretionary
actions, such as poor performance appraisal, assignment of less desirable or less
important duties, and denial of promotion. On the other hand, the least
frequently cited forms of reprisal were more overt, objectively negative actions,
such as grade level demotion, suspension from one's job, and reassignment to
a different geographic area.
Id.
126. See OFFICE OF MERIT SYSTEMS REVIEW AND STUDIES, UNITED STATES MERIT
SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, BLOWING THE WHISTLE IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 1980 AND 1983 SURVEY FINDINGS 4 (1984)
[hereinafter 1984 MSPB STUDY]. Congress noted these results during its consideration of
the 1986 amendments to the Act. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 1,
at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269-70.
127. 1984 MSPB STUDY, supra note 126, at 5.
128. Id. at 1-3 (outlining legislative and executive efforts to encourage whistleblowing
by federal employees); see also supra note 116 (discussing earlier congressional efforts
to encourage whistleblowing).
129. 1984 MSPB STUDY, supra note 126, at 5-6.
130. Id. at 6.
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Recent MSPB research, undertaken in late 1992 to update the earlier
findings, evaluated the responses of more than 13,000 employees of the
federal government.' The results indicate that 18% percent of the
respondents had recently acquired direct knowledge of misconduct.'32
One-half of these employees stated that they had reported this informa-
tion.'33 Although this represents an increase in the proportion of
employees who were willing to make disclosures, the study also revealed
that fear of retaliation remains a major deterrent to whistleblowing by
federal employees. Thirty-three percent of respondents who had observed
wrongful conduct reported that the threat of retaliation prevented them
from revealing it. 34  Moreover, the results reflect that 37% of
whistleblowers experienced or were threatened with reprisal for their
disclosures.
35
These statistics belie the assertions of those who claim that it is not
only unwise but also unnecessary to allow federal workers to file qui tam
suits under the FCA. 136 Taken together, the statistics demonstrate that
government employees' fears of retaliation have increased over time and
are grounded in experience.' 37  Further, these circumstances persist
despite concerted efforts by Congress and others to establish disclosure
channels and provide protection from reprisal. 31
131. See OFFICE OF POLICY AND EVALUATION, U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION
BOARD i (1993).
132. Id. at ii.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., 1993 Hearing, supra note 102, at 66 (statement of Robert D. Wallick,
former member, Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Laws)
(enumerating alternative, existing outlets for federal employee disclosures).
137. Indeed, one government employee relator has suggested that such individuals
might deserve higher recoveries than their counterparts in the private sector, given the
barriers they face. See 1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 116 (statement of Leon
Weinstein).
138. See, e.g., 1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 129 (statement of Arthur P. Williams)
(describing retribution experienced by former government attorney in response to
disclosures, and noting that "despite the whistleblower protection law, government
employees still face a stark threat to their career [sic] in retaliation for exposing fraudulent
claims."). See generally Terry M. Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblower Statutes and
Reality: Is There a Need for Realignment?, 1990 PROC. PAC. Sw. Bus. L. ASS'N 73
(discussing additional problems legislators need to consider); Terry M. Dworkin & Janet
P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They Working?, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 241 (1987)
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Government workers' disclosures should be viewed as an important
resource in efforts to deter and detect fraud against the United States. 39
No other group of individuals is more likely to have access to informa-
tion regarding misconduct by federal contractors. 4 1 The opportunity
to make a claim under the Act is especially critical in circumstances
where recourse through more usual channels has been unavailing.'4'
As noted -by the Senate Judiciary Committee,
[t]here are many reasons why government officials may
fail to act appropriately when faced with [evidence of
fraud]: bureaucratic corruption, inertia, incompetence, or
lack of adequate resources; the potential for political
embarrassment; and the perception that exposure of
wrongdoing may undercut overall support for the program
that is involved.
142
In such cases, the FCA provides a method to detect wrongdoing that
might not otherwise come to light. The enhanced possibility of exposure
provided by government employees' access to the FCA framework may
also deter misconduct. 143
At the same time, however, a persuasive argument may be made for
imposing limits on government employees' access to the FCA. Any
opportunity for personal financial gain, while performing a public duty,
presents a conflict of interest.' 44 This concern is most clearly implicat-
(reporting the results of studies which concluded that state anti-retaliation statutes are
ineffective in encouraging whistleblowing).
139. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 14, at 310-11.
140. See, e.g., Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 14, at 311; 1993 Hearing, supra note
102, at 107 (letter of James M. Hagood); id. at 128 (statement of Thomas Devine and Jeff
Ruch, Government Accountability Project).
141. See 1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 62 (statement of John R. Phillips).
142. HoUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 57, at 5. See also 1992 Hearing,
supra note 87, at 117-18 (statement of Leon Weinstein) (observing that disclosing
information regarding fraud through existing government bureaucracies is sometimes a
futile effort).
143. See 1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 118 (statement of Leon Weinstein).
Weinstein observed that "recent rulings by appellate courts giving federal workers the right
to bring [FCA] suits has [sic] sent shivers down the spine of many bureaucrats, and sent
shock-waves throughout the federal bureaucracy. The ability of these bureaucrats to ignore
or cover-up fraud is now severely threatened." Id.
144. See id. at 40-41 (statement of Dennis H. Trosch, Deputy General Counsel,
Acquisitions and Logistics, United States Department of Defense) (cautioning that "[ain
employee's efforts to seek a share of the Government's recovery is [sic] in conflict with
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ed in the present context where a qui tam action is brought by a
government employee whose job responsibilities include the investigation
or prosecution of fraudulent claims. Obviously, it would be improper to
permit an individual to use information that she should have reported
through official channels to support an FCA action. The chance for
individual profit might also discourage disclosures via traditional
channels by those employees who have a more general obligation to
discover and report fraud against the government.
145
his responsibility to place the Government's interests above his own"). See generally 1992
Hearing, supra note 87, at 42 (statement of Mr. Trosch) (government employee suits must
be prohibited to maintain fair dealing and the appearance of fair dealing). In the past,
moreover, the government has taken the position that an employee who receives payment
for his role in an FCA action has contravened "numerous executive orders, federal
regulations, and policy statements, and ... the common law of agency." Id. at 11
(statement of Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General). In his statement, Mr. Gerson
also called attention to "criminal statutes ... forbidding government employees from
receiving more than their salaries for work that they are already required to perform and
for working on matters in which they have a financial interest." Id. See generally Exec.
Order No. 12,731, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1990) reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (Supp. V 1993)
(Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch).
145. See 1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 8 (statement of Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant
Attorney General) (arguing that "unlike private persons, [government workers] are already
required by law to report fraud and are paid by the taxpayers to do so; by giving these
employees qui tam rewards the taxpayers are essentially paying them for information that
the government rightfully already possesses").
Conflict of interest concerns in this context are somewhat similar to those raised with
reference to law enforcement personnel who seek rewards for information leading to the
successful prosecution of criminals, or for recovering lost property. Contract doctrine
establishes that such individuals may not claim a reward publicly offered by a private party
because they have a pre-existing duty to investigate and enforce the law. Thus, the
officer's performance of his or her job responsibilities is insufficient consideration to
enforce the reward offer. See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 180, at 261
(1952). This approach is driven by public policy concerns. See Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Mathews, 209 F. Supp. 822, 825 (S.D. W. Va. 1962) (denying County investigator an
offered reward); Gray v. Martino, 103 A. 24 (N.J. 1918) (denying police officer reward
in theft of diamonds); Somerset Bank v. Edmund, 81 N.E. 641 (Ohio 1907) (denying
constable reward in bank robbery). Such cases are distinguished from those involving "an
ordinary contractual duty in that the public are more directly interested in the officer's
performance, and also that public officers may be more likely to scamp their jobs in the
hope of extorting special compensation from individuals." CORBIN, supra, § 180. The
concern that an officer will shirk his or her duties in order to reap a personal benefit is
obviously comparable to objections raised regarding FCA claims by government
employees.
The exceptions to the common law approach are pertinent, as well: Rewards paid by
government agencies and those based on conduct outside the scope of an individual's
official duties are permissible. Id. These exceptions are justified because "the public
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Yet, the federal treasury is the primary beneficiary of successful
FCA actions. Thus, the benefits available to qui tam plaintiffs are
distinguishable from other instances in which employees enjoy personal
financial gain based on information acquired through their jobs. 146
Further, the existence of other laws in which Congress has specifically
authorized monetary rewards for government workers, including those
with responsibility for discovering fraud, illustrates the fundamental
legitimacy of programs offering financial incentives to government
employees.1 7
Other concerns regarding FCA actions by government employees are
equally valid with reference to a qui tam lawsuit filed by a private
citizen. Critics raise the specter of government employee relators racing
to the courthouse, and competing with their colleagues to collect a qui
tam bounty.' 41 In addition, federal prosecutors investigating fraud may
be forced to file their suits prematurely, thus jeopardizing their cases
from the outset.149 Finally, potential defendants may be forewarned of
policy involved is determined by the representatives of the public duly empowered for the
purpose." Id. See also United States v. Matthews, 173 U.S. 381, 385 (1899) (noting that
the distinction "between the right of an officer to take from a private individual a reward
or compensation for the performance of his official duty, and the capacity of such officer
to receive a reward expressly authorized by competent legislative authority ... is too
obvious to require anything but [a] statement"). Clearly, this reasoning would permit
government employee FCA claims, as long as Congress authorizes them.
Under the exception for conduct outside the scope of official duties, consideration to
support a reward offer is supplied by performance of services beyond the officer's job
description. CoRBrN, supra, § 180. FCA actions by government employees who are not
responsible for investigating and prosecuting fraud are supported by this exception, which
applies if "any part of the service" is outside the scope of the employee's responsibilities.
Id.
146. Hanifin, supra note 60, at 605.
147. See 1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 12 (statement of Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant
Attorney General) (noting that "[t]here are several award provisions in current law that
permit rewards to government employees for conduct that would encompass reporting
fraud"); see also Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 14, at 326-27 (discussing historical
reward statutes).
148. 1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 13 (statement of Stuart M. Gerson).
149. Id. at 13. Assistant Attorney General Gerson stated:
Given the adverse Circuit Court decisions, we are now unable to conduct
investigations without the distinct possibility that some federal employee either
working on the investigation or who obtains knowledge of it will see the
obvious possibility of a personal reward and will race us to the courthouse
before the case is ready to be prosecuted. If government employees are
permitted to bring qui tam suits, the lawsuits that we would otherwise bring will
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government action, and could take steps to destroy evidence or otherwise
impede ongoing investigations into their activities. 5 '
The government has a legitimate interest in controlling the course
of its investigations, but the concerns noted above are not dependent on
the identity of the relator's employer. For instance, while it is surely
inconvenient for a federal prosecutor, in the midst of a fraud investiga-
tion, to deal with a related qui tam action,' it is unlikely that the
relator's status as a federal employee will interfere with the government's
case.
be brought by a federal employee who gets to the courthouse first.
Id. The time frame of this statement suggests that Gerson was referring to the decisions
of the circuit courts in United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493 (11 th
Cir. 1991) and United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d
1416 (9th Cir. 1991).
150. Williams, 931 F.2d at 1503; 1993 Hearing, supra note 102, at 129 (statement of
Thomas Devine and Jeff Ruch, Government Accountability Project); see HOUSE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 57, at 8-9 (summarizing hearing testimony regarding these
arguments). In addition to the primary concerns discussed in the text, the Justice
Department has cautioned that prosecutions may be jeopardized when government
employee witnesses' testimony is impeached on the basis of their financial interests, due
to their status as qui tam plaintiffs. 1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 14. The possibility
that an investigating federal worker, enticed by the opportunity to file his or her own FCA
action, might minimize the wrongful conduct he discovered, thus discouraging follow-up
by others, was also decried at the hearing on H.R. 4563. Id. at 15-16. Further, the
government warned against "morale problems in government service among employees
assigned to non-fraud investigations or smaller dollar value investigations; and the
misallocation of government resources through individual decisions by government
employees to spend official time on cases they hope could lead to potential recoveries
rather than on other assigned duties." Id. at 15. See 1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 43
(statement of Dennis H. Trosch, Deputy General Counsel, Acquisitions and Logistics,
United States Department of Defense) ("There is also the potential for severe morale
problems within the Department among employees who are not assigned to investigative
or audit jobs that give access to the type of information upon which a qui tam case could
be based as they see their colleagues reaping large windfalls merely for doing their jobs.").
Finally, the specter of retaliatory FCA suits filed against former colleagues by disgruntled,
properly discharged employees, id. at 15-16 (statement of Mr. Gerson), or against officials
by subordinates who disagreed with management decisions, id. at 43 (statement of Mr.
Trosch), were presented.
Government officials gave no illustrations of cases in which these difficulties had, in
fact, arisen. In fact, an attorney who helped draft the 1986 amendments and whose
practice focuses on FCA actions testified that he had "seen no evidence that any significant
problem now exists" with reference to suits by government employees. Id. at 62
(statement of John R. Phillips).
151. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
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Because the courts calculate FCA damages on a per-claim basis, 52
commentators have raised the concern that government employees could
be "tempt[ed] ... to increase the amount of their personal profit by
temporarily ignoring conduct that might be or might become fraudu-
lent."'153 Delays that prolong wrongful conduct and hinder or prevent
investigations are a significant concern. 54  Presumably, however, a
privately-employed potential qui tam plaintiff might be similarly enticed.
Thus, this argument does not provide a compelling basis to distinguish
among classes of potential relators. 55
152. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
153. Hanifin, supra note 60, at 612. This concern has been raised by a Department
of Defense representative, who stated:
We have a number of people involved in contract administration. They may
come across deficiencies in contractor's [sic] performance. It's important, from
our point of view, that we follow up with these deficiencies. Some of them are
far from false claims at the time they occur. The very large potential dollar
recovery could motivate an employee not to pursue the job standards that we
expect of him, and we can't have that. It is most important, from our point of
view, that deficiencies in contract performance be brought to the attention of the
employee's supervisor or the contractor in some cases, and the process for
resolving contractor deficiencies be followed.
1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 39 (statement of Dennis H. Trosch, Deputy General
Counsel, Acquisition and Logistics, United States Department of Defense); see also id. at
42-43. See generally Mintz, supra note 107, at B14 (noting concerns raised by defense
contractors that "employees may allow the financial damage to the government to mount
before informing authorities, so they can collect a larger award for kicking off a probe").
154. In a statement submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee, a representative of
the Aerospace Industries Association of America asserted that Chester Walsh, a successful
qui tam plaintiff, "delayed reporting fraudulent acts in at least 11 different programs for
years .... As a result, the damages associated with this fraud more than doubled." 1993
Hearing, supra note 102, at 80 (statement of Charles F.C. Ruff, Esq.). Walsh's attorney
portrayed his client's efforts to bring wrongdoing to light in more heroic terms. Id. at 16
(statement of John R. Phillips, Esq.).
155. Mr. Hanifin illustrates his concerns regarding delayed disclosures by noting that
"[e]rror caused by ignorance or negligence might be prevented by a timely warning from
a government inspector, saving the government as well as the contractor from much
trouble and expense." Hanifin, supra note 60, at 613. In such cases, however, there
would be no basis for a FCA suit, as the contractor would not have the requisite intent to
defraud the government. See supra note 23 for a definition of knowledge.
Mr. Hanifin also argues that "turning bureaucrats into bounty hunters could destroy the
working relationships [between government officials and private contractors] essential to
long-term contracts." Hanifin, supra note 60, at 613. While acknowledging a key
competing consideration (that "government inspectors must maintain the independence
necessary to ensure that the equipment and services supplied meet specifications"), he fears
that "[a] few well-publicized qui tam suits by government employees could persuade
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Finally, the fear that throngs of government employees will file FCA
suits of dubious value is groundless. 5 6 FCA actions are often highly
complex'57 and litigating qui tam cases requires the relator to invest an
enormous amount of time and money. 58 These considerations, which
are well known to attorneys who evaluate these cases, provide a
substantial disincentive to spurious claims) 59  Such deterrents are
further buttressed by the Act's provision indicating that a court may
order an unsuccessful relator pursuing a case on his or her own to pay
the defendant's attorneys' fees and expenses if it concludes that the
action "was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for
purposes of harassment.""
Thus, the main impediments to fraud prosecutions identified by
opponents of government employee suits-tip-offs to potential
defendants, the forced filing of immature cases resulting from the
contractors that almost any government official, whether or not he is an inspector, is a
hostile potential plaintiff looking for the qui tam jackpot. Government workers would be
tempted to view every contractor as a potential defendant." Id. Mr. Hanifin provides no
evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, to support these concerns. If valid, they may well be
outweighed by the importance of independence on the part of officials responsible for
contract management and oversight.
156. See 1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 11, 13 (testimony of Stuart M. Gerson,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice).
157. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 14, at 326; see also 1992 Hearing, supra note
87, at 65 (statement of John R. Phillips) (observing that "[flalse claims defendants
routinely field a phalanx of attorneys to represent them thoroughly and aggressively").
158. See 1992 Hearing, supra note 87, at 65 (statement of John R. Phillips)
(describing his representation of a private employee relator in pending case. In the course
of five years, his firm had spent three million dollars, including expenses, and 15,000
hours in preparation).
159. See id. at 58 (statement of John R_ Phillips) ("I want to stress, based on our
experience, regarding the concern of the Department of Justice that government employees
will file these cases because they will be possibly the recipient of great fortune .... that
90 percent of those cases will be screened out by lawyers."); see also 1993 Hearing, supra
note 102, at 90-91 (statement of Senator Charles E. Grassley) (noting disincentives to
filing frivolous suits).
160. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4); see also Qui Tam Plaintiff is Ordered to Pay Contractor
$147,000 in Attorney Fees, 12 Employee Rel. Wkly. (BNA) 598 (May 30, 1994)
(imposing fees when privately employed qui tam plaintiff refused to drop case despite
receiving uncontroverted evidence that his claims were meritless). See generally 1993
Hearing, supra note 102, at 90-91 (statement of Senator Charles E. Grassley) (noting that
defendants have sought attorney's fees in few cases, thus inferring that few frivolous suits
have been brought).
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initiation of FCA actions, and the withholding of important
information from prosecutors by persons planning to file FCA
claims-are equally likely to occur in relation to private qui tam actions.
In addition, several of the Act's procedural provisions operate to
minimize these threats to prosecution. The requirement that the qui tam
complaint and supporting data be served on the government and remain
under seal while the government evaluates the case 62 is particularly
noteworthy in this regard. 63
Nonetheless, the conflict of interest inherent in qui tam cases
brought by government workers, especially those whose job responsibili-
ties include investigating or prosecuting false claims, presents a
compelling basis for distinguishing them among the groups of potential
relators.' 4 Although citizens may have a general moral obligation to
report wrongdoing affecting society, employees have a specific duty to
protect the interests of their employers.' 65 An employee who fails to
report wrongdoing affecting the employer presumably breaches this duty.
161. See United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1503 n.16 (11th
Cir. 1991) ("[C]oncerns articulated by the United States describe administrative difficulties
that might arise when any private qui tam plaintiff files suit prior to the completion of a
government investigation.').
162. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). The statute states that "[t]he complaint shall be filed
in camera, shall remain under seal for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the
defendant until the court so orders." Id. The DOJ may move for extensions of the 60-day
period "for good cause shown." Id. § 3730(b)(3). Indeed, Congress added this provision
to the Act in 1986, explicitly "in response to Justice Department concerns that qui tam
complaints filed in open court might tip off targets of ongoing criminal investigations."
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 1, at 16, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5281.
163. In addition to the requirement that the relator file the case under seal, the Act
allows the government to dismiss an action if it gives the relator notice, and the relator has
an opportunity to be heard on the motion. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A). Further, the
government can ensure that an action is properly litigated by exercising its right to
intervene. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
164. But see HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 57, at 5 (noting
whistleblower advocates' argument that the FCA's jurisdictional bar on actions based on
publicly disclosed information sufficiently addresses conflict of interest concerns). See
supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the public disclosure
requirement.
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) (duty of loyalty).
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These expectations are enhanced in the context of government workers,
who are obligated to serve the public as well as their employer.'66
These concerns suggest an approach that increases the detection and
deterrence of wrongdoing by stimulating whistleblowing on one hand,
and encouraging government workers completely to discharge their job
responsibilities on the other. The primary components of the framework
recently considered by Congress-notification requirements plus a
waiting period during which the government may file suit-address these
objectives.' 67 The proposed legislation would be improved, however,
by establishing different filing prerequisites for those federal workers
responsible for investigating or prosecuting fraud. Claims in which a
government investigation is already in progress and those which are
based on new allegations should be distinguished. Further, Congress
should reduce the number of persons to whom notification must be made,
and create an incentive for the whistleblower to support fully the govern-
ment's development of the potential claim.
V. A FRAMEWORK FOR ACCESS
Federal employees who are responsible for uncovering fraud have
an acute obligation to disclose evidence of misconduct without regard to
personal benefit. They are also more likely routinely to have access to
information regarding false claims. Therefore, a self-serving decision
about the handling of evidence has a direct and immediate impact on
government efforts to uncover and eradicate fraud. 6 Accordingly,
166. See Exec. Order No. 12,731, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1990) reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301
(Supp. V 1993) (Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 92-96.
168. Courts and other observers have expressed the view that access to the FCA
should be limited, or eliminated altogether, for federal employees who are responsible for
detecting and prosecuting fraud. See, e.g., United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co.,
913 F.2d 17, 20 (Ist Cir. 1990) (noting that "[i]t was LeBlanc's responsibility, a condition
of his employment, to uncover fraud. The fruits of his effort belong to his employer-the
government"); 1993 Hearing, supra note 102, at 43, 47 (statement of Donald J. Kinlin,
Chairman, Section of Public Contract Law, American Bar Association) (urging that
"auditors, investigators, attorneys, and contracting officers not be allowed" to file claims
under the Act); see supra note 145 (recognizing an exception in contract law permitting
the enforcement of a private party's promise to pay a reward to a law enforcement official
if the conduct at issue is outside the scope of the individual's job responsibilities). Butsee
United States v. CAC-Ramsay, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1158 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (permitting qui
tam recovery for former employee of the Department of Health and Human Services
whose principal job responsibility was conducting fraud investigations).
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federal workers whose responsibilities include investigating or prosecut-
ing fraud, or both ("responsible employees"), should be permitted to file
a qui tam action only in instances where the case would otherwise not
be pursued. 69
To achieve this objective, responsible employees should be required
to disclose, in writing, all information regarding suspected and confirmed
fraud through the proper reporting channels available to them in the
ordinary course of their jobs. 7 ' In cases where the responsible
employee believes that the person or persons to whom the employee
would ordinarily report the information is involved in the alleged
misconduct, the employee should then be permitted to make full
disclosure to the Attorney General. 171
There are several reasons why notification to a single authority is
preferable to the multi-level requirement imposed in recent legislative
proposals. First, it encourages, to the extent possible, performance ofjob
responsibilities within the context of existing reporting relationships.
Second, it minimizes the administrative burden on the person making the
disclosure and decreases the likelihood that the person may inadvertently
fail to comply with a prerequisite to suit. Third, it reduces the possibility
that a potential defendant will destroy evidence and cover-up the
fraud.172  Most importantly, it reduces the perceived, as well as the
actual, threat of retaliation against the whistleblower, thus increasing the
likelihood that a report will be made. 73
Following the responsible employee's disclosure, the report recipient
should have twelve months from the date of the disclosure to initiate
169. A responsible employee is any person whose duties include the detection,
investigation, or prosecution of fraud against the government and any person whose job
involves assisting or supporting such activities.
170. For a discussion of the benefits of intra-organizational whistleblowing, see Terry
Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting the
Interests.of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267, 299-307
(1991).
171. The Attorney General is recommended because she is charged with enforcing the
FCA under existing law. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a).
172. Whistleblower advocates have raised the additional concern that a multi-level
reporting requirement will increase the likelihood that potential defendants may become
aware of the investigation and take steps to thwart it. 1993 Hearing, supra note 102, at
129 (statement of Thomas Devine and Jeff Ruch, Government Accountability Project).
173. See generally MYRON P. GLAZER & PENINA M. GLAZER, THE WHISTLEBLOWERS:
ExPosING CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY (1989) (describing the
consequences suffered by whistleblowers).
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prosecution or propose a resolution of the matter. The recipient should
be authorized to seek one twelve-month extension of this period. 74 If
resolution of the matter is initiated prior to the expiration of the twelve
or twenty-four month period, the responsible employee should not be
permitted to file an FCA lawsuit on the basis of the disclosed informa-
tion, and should not share in any recovery based on the FCA. If
resolution of the matter has not been initiated by that time, however, the
responsible employee should be allowed to initiate a qui tam lawsuit on
the same basis, and with the same rights, as any other relator. At this
point, any conflict between the interests of the government and the
responsible employee would be minimal.
Government employees who do not have specific anti-fraud
responsibilities ("other employees") should be given more immediate
access to the FCA's financial incentives for providing information. Here,
conflict of interest considerations are not as significant as they are with
reference to responsible employees. There will also be less interference
with the government's interest in managing investigations. Therefore,
other employees should be authorized to serve qui tam complaints to the
Justice Department, under seal, in the same manner as private sector
relators. 7 '
In cases where Justice or another government agency is already
investigating the matter, however, the federal employee should be
obligated to delay his claim to reduce the impediments to successful
prosecution that might otherwise result.'76 Therefore, the sixty-day
period within which the DOJ is normally required to respond to the
complaint should be increased to twelve months, subject to opportunities
for extension included in existing law.'77 Regardless of whether the
government initiates prosecution at the expiration of this period, the
employee should be permitted to file a qui tam lawsuit on the same
basis, and with the same rights, as any other relator. In cases where the
matter was not already under investigation when the employee served his
174. The process for requesting an extension set forth in previously introduced
legislation should be retained: the motion would be filed in camera, and would require a
showing "that the additional period is necessary for the Government to decide whether or
not to file such action." See, e.g., H.R. 2915, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1993).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
176. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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complaint on the Justice Department, the employee should have the same
rights as a relator employed in the private sector.
Former federal employees who seek to file qui tam actions based on
information gained during their tenure with the federal government
should be subject to similar limitations. Although disclosures by prior
responsible employees should be made directly to the Attorney General,
as there would be little need to preserve pievious reporting relationships,
the remaining restrictions outlined above as to current responsible
employees should apply. FCA actions by other former federal employees
should be handled as if the relators were still employed by the govern-
ment.
In addition, an FCA award otherwise available to any current or
former federal employee should be subject to reduction by the court if
the relator did not cooperate fully in the investigation and prosecution of
the matter. Full cooperation would include the complete and timely
disclosure of any pertinent information about the claim available to the
relator. Given the substantially reduced effectiveness of financial
incentives for whistleblowing when they are made discretionary,' 8 the
burden of demonstrating the employee's failure to cooperate should be
borne by the government.
VI. CONCLUSION
Allowing federal workers to file qui tam actions may well enhance
the detection and deterrence of misconduct. The FCA's financial
incentives are needed to overcome potential whistleblowers' pervasive
and apparently realistic fears of retribution. Yet, important consider-
ations support the imposition of limits on such suits by government
employees.
The proposed framework makes FCA rewards available to
government employees, thus providing an incentive to counteract the
personal and professional risks faced by potential whistleblowers. The
proposed prerequisites to filing a qui tam action may reduce somewhat
the effectiveness of the Act's whistleblowing incentive because the time
between the disclosure and the relator's recovery will increase. 79 This
178. See supra text accompanying note 100.
179. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 14, at 298 & n.92 (arguing that the
motivational effects of financial incentives decrease as the time between the act and its
reward increase).
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framework, however, ameliorates concerns regarding inappropriate
impediments to prosecution by the notification/delay requirements and by
the full cooperation limitation. Conflict of interest concerns are
addressed, albeit not entirely eliminated, by the distinctions drawn
between categories of employees. In sum, bureaucracy busters are
supported, and double-dippers are dissuaded by this framework. Thus,
by striving for the reduction of fraud against the federal government, this
proposal effectively serves the primary objective of the 1986 amend-
ments.
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